Cryptography is important for management. Recently new results have posed a serious problem to present cryptography protocols. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is one of the most promising solutions to this problem. Some proposed Double-Lock Encryption protocols in QKD assumes that the qbits are 2-component. In this letter we propose a protocol without this assumption.
Cryptography is important for management. Recently it became clear that quantum computers pose a serious threat to the presently used protocols which depend on some difficult mathematical problems e.g. RSA protocol [1] . Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is one of the most promising solutions to this problem. Its main advantage is that it depends on physical quantum laws e.g. entanglement and uncertainty [2] . Its main disadvantage is that it was difficult to implement in practice. Recently this problem has been solved [3] . QKD has been used for satellite transmission. Double lock encryption (Zero knowledge) is a protocol that increases the protocol security [4] . Some proposed DoubleLock Encryption protocols in QKD assumes that the qbits are 2-component. In this letter we propose a protocol without this assumption [5, 6] .
We apply it to the BB84 protocol which is one of the most popular QKD protocols [7] .
Quantum Double-Lock (Zero knowledge) Encryption
Recently quantum 3-pass protocol has been proposed [5, 6] . It was assumed that the qbits are 2-component hence they use the fact that the group SO(2) is commutative. This is Not true for SO(n), n>2.
Here we propose the following protocol which does not make this assumption:
Assume that sender A sends a string of qbits {qba(1),qba(2)… qba(s)} to a receiver B. He receives them which cause some errors according to Uncertainty principle [2] . The receiver B sends back the extended string {qba'(1), qba'(2)…qba'(s), qbb(s+1),…qbb(s+r)}. When the sender A receive it the correct subset of {qba'(1), qba'(2)…qba'(s)} will form her key. The extended string is sent back to the receiver B and he gets {qba'(1), qba'(2)…qba'(s), qbb'(s+1),…qbb'(s+r)}. The correct subset of the string {qbb'(s+1),…qbb'(s+r)} will be his key. No assumptions are made on the number of components used for each qbit.
These results are also applicable for the E91 protocol.
